Benign or adversarial?
Binary classification of each prompt sent to a code model. This is the main leaderboard.
Label: 0 benign, 1 adversarial
Shared Task 2 · LangCode Workshop at NAACL 2027
Guardrails for code-mixed and transliterated prompts
Given a prompt sent to a code model, decide whether it is benign or adversarial, and if adversarial, what kind of attack it is. Prompts are code-mixed across low-resource languages or transliterated into non-Latin scripts, with programming keywords kept as they are.
The task
One prompt to a code model, code-mixed across low-resource languages or transliterated into a non-Latin script.
Benign or adversarial (Subtask A), and the attack type for adversarial prompts (Subtask B).
Code-model safety filters are calibrated almost entirely on English. Rewrite a malicious request in a low-resource language, or spell it out in another script, keep the code keywords intact, and many filters stop working. In MALICE, the best classifier's accuracy fell from 0.93 on English to 0.21 on code-mixed malicious prompts, and even the most safety-aligned model tested produced about 3× more malicious code.
Findings from MALICE (Raihan, Meher, Dhingra, Zampieri; Findings of EMNLP 2026).
Binary classification of each prompt sent to a code model. This is the main leaderboard.
Label: 0 benign, 1 adversarial
For adversarial prompts, identify the attack type. Finer-grained, and closer to what a real guardrail needs to log.
Attack categories are listed with the training data
Every prompt is either code-mixed or transliterated. See Data for the 18 languages.
Two phases, both on CodaBench
Phase 1
Oct 20, 2026 – Jan 15, 2027
Phase 2 · Final
Jan 15 – Jan 31, 2027
Next steps
LangCode 2027 · NAACL 2027
Teams present their systems at LangCode 2027, the First Language and Code Workshop, co-located with NAACL 2027, June 1–5.